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# Smart Electronic Systems – Facts Vs Fictions

IIIT Naya Raipur

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
# Talk - Outline

- What are smart possibilities?
- Challenges in the current generation CE design
- Energy Smart CE
- Security Smart CE
- Response Smart CE
- Design Trade-offs in CE
- Conclusions and Future Directions



# What is Common Among These?



# Does Smart Mean Electronic?



# Does Smart Mean Electric?




Source: S. K. Rastogi, A. Sankar, K. Manglik, S. K. Mishra, and S. P. Mohanty, "Toward the Vision of All-Electric Vehicles in a Decade", IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (CEM), Volume 8, Issue 2, March 2019, pp. 103--107.

# Does Smart Mean Small?




# Does Smart Mean Portable?



# Does Smart Mean Battery-Operated?



# Does Smart Mean Cyber-Enabled?



# Does Smart Mean Autonomous?



# Does Smart Mean AI or ML?




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# Challenges in Current Generation CE Design




# IoT – Selected Challenges



Source: Mohanty ICIT 2017 Keynote


# Massive Growth of Sensors/Things



Source: <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/history-iot-industrial-internet-sensors-data-lakes-0-downtime>

# Design Cost

- The design cost is a one-time cost.
- Design cost needs to be small to make a smart city realization possible.



Source: <http://www.industrialisation-produits-electroniques.fr>


# Operational Cost

- The operations cost is that required to maintain the smart city.
- A small operations cost will make it easier for cities to operate in the long run with minimal burden on the city budget.




# Consumer Electronics Demand More and More Energy

Energy consumption in homes by end uses  
quadrillion Btu and percent



U.S. residential sector electricity  
consumption by major end uses,  
2016



Notes:  
<sup>1</sup>Includes consumption for heat and operating furnace fans and boiler pumps.  
<sup>2</sup>Includes miscellaneous appliances, clothes washers and dryers, computers and related equipment, stoves, dishwashers, heating elements, and motors not included in the uses listed above.

Quadrillion BTU (or quad): 1 quad =  $10^{15}$  BTU = 1.055 Exa Joule (EJ). **Source:** U.S. Energy Information Administration


# Security, Privacy, and IP-Rights




Source: Mohanty ICIT 2017 Keynote

# Security - System ...

## Power Grid Attack



Source: <http://www.csoonline.com/article/3177209/security/why-the-ukraine-power-grid-attacks-should-raise-alarm.html>



Source: <http://money.cnn.com/2014/06/01/technology/security/car-hack/>




Source: <http://politicalblindspot.com/u-s-drone-hacked-and-hijacked-with-ease/>

# Huge Amount of Data

## What Happens in an Internet Minute?

"The world's most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data."



Estimated Data Generated per Day: 2.5 quintillion bytes

## And Future Growth is Staggering



"Data is the new gold."

# ESR-Smart in Smart City Components



**iPhone 5**  
\$0.41/year (3.5 kWh)



**Galaxy S III**  
\$0.53/year (4.9 kWh)




**Energy Smart**

Source: <https://mashable.com/2012/10/05/energy-efficient-smartphone/>

Energy consumption is minimal and adaptive for longer battery life and lower energy bills.

Security of systems and data.

**Security Smart**



Accurate sensing, analytics, and fast actuation.

**Response Smart**

Source: Mohanty iSES 2018 Keynote


Source: Reis, et al. Elsevier EMS Dec 2015

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
# Energy Smart



# Smart Energy




Source: <https://www.nec.com/en/global/solutions/energy/index.html>




# Smart Energy

## Internet of Energy



Quality, sustainable, uninterrupted energy with minimal carbon footprint.

# Smart Energy – Smart Consumption




Battery Saver





Smart Home

# Energy Efficient Electronics: Possible Solution Fronts



Source: Mohanty ZINC 2018 Keynote


# Sustainable IoT - Low-Power Sensors and Efficient Routing




- IoT - sensors near the data collector drain energy faster than other nodes.
- **Solution Idea** - Mobile sink in which the network is balanced with node energy consumption.
- **Solution Need**: New data routing to forward data towards base station using mobile data collector, in which two data collectors follow a predefined path.

Source: S. S. Roy, D. Puthal, S. Sharma, S. P. Mohanty, and A. Y. Zomaya, "Building a Sustainable Internet of Things", *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (CEM)*, Volume 7, Issue 2, March 2018, pp. 42--49.

# Energy-Efficient Hardware - Dual-Voltage




Pin Diagram




Datapath Architecture

Hardware Layout



Physical Design Data


Total Area : 16.2 sq mm  
 No. of Transistors: 1.4 million  
 Power Consumption: 0.3 mW



Source: S. P. Mohanty, N. Ranganathan, and K. Balakrishnan, "A Dual Voltage-Frequency VLSI Chip for Image Watermarking in DCT Domain", *IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems II (TCAS-II)*, Vol. 53, No. 5, May 2006, pp. 394-398.


# Energy Storage - High Capacity and Efficiency Needed

Battery	Conversion Efficiency
Li-ion	80% - 90%
Lead-Acid	50% - 92%
NiMH	66%



Intelligent Battery

Mohanty 2010: IEEE Computer, March 2010  
 Mohanty 2018: ICCE 2018



Lithium Polymer Battery



Source: Mohanty MAMI 2017 Keynote

# Energy Star Ratings



More than  
**90%**

of Americans recognize the  
ENERGY STAR® brand.

ENERGY STAR  
partners are leading the way,  
contributing to the prevention of  
**2.8 Billion** metric tons of  
GHG emissions through energy efficiency.

Since 1992, the program has  
helped families and  
businesses save

**4.6 Trillion** kilowatt hours



and **\$430 Billion**  
on energy costs.



Source: <https://www.breeam.com/>



Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design

**GREEN BUILDING**




Source: <https://new.usgbc.org/leed>

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# Security Smart



# Security, Authentication, Access Control – Home, Facilities, ...



Source: Mohanty ISCT 2019 Keynote

# CE Systems – Diverse Security/ Privacy/ Ownership Needs

## Medical Devices

RFID Chip



Pace maker

Insulin Pump

Heart Rate Monitor

## Home Devices



Smart Coffee Maker



Smart Thermostat



Smart Phones/ Tablets



Smart Clothing



Smart watch

## Business Devices




Smart Payment Systems



ATM/Banking Systems

## Entertainment Devices



Drones /UAVs



Video Games

## Transportation Devices




Smart Vehicles/ Autonomous Vehicles



Smart Traffic Controllers

Source: Munir and Mohanty 2019, CE Magazine Jan 2019

# Selected Attacks on a CE System – Security, Privacy, IP Right



Diverse forms of Attacks, following are not the same: System Security, Information Security, Information Privacy, System Trustworthiness, Hardware IP protection, Information Copyright Protection.

# CE Security – Selected Solutions

Analysis of selected approaches to security and privacy issues in CE.

Category	Current Approaches	Advantages	Disadvantages
Confidentiality	Symmetric key cryptography	Low computation overhead	Key distribution problem
	Asymmetric key cryptography	Good for key distribution	High computation overhead
Integrity	Message authentication codes	Verification of message contents	Additional computation overhead
Availability	Signature-based authentication	Avoids unnecessary signature computations	Requires additional infrastructure and rekeying scheme
Authentication	Physically unclonable functions (PUFs)	High speed	Additional implementation challenges
	Message authentication codes	Verification of sender	Computation overhead
Nonrepudiation	Digital signatures	Link message to sender	Difficult in pseudonymous systems
Identity privacy	Pseudonym	Disguise true identity	Vulnerable to pattern analysis
	Attribute-based credentials	Restrict access to information based on shared secrets	Require shared secrets with all desired services
Information privacy	Differential privacy	Limit privacy exposure of any single data record	True user-level privacy still challenging
	Public-key cryptography	Integratable with hardware	Computationally intensive
Location privacy	Location cloaking	Personalized privacy	Requires additional infrastructure
Usage privacy	Differential privacy	Limit privacy exposure of any single data record	Recurrent/time-series data challenging to keep private

Source: D. A. Hahn, A. Munir, and S. P. Mohanty, "Security and Privacy Issues in Contemporary Consumer Electronics", IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (CEM), Volume 8, Issue 1, January 2019, pp. 95--99.

# Smart Healthcare - Security and Privacy Issue



## Selected Smart Healthcare Security/Privacy Challenges

Data Eavesdropping

Data Confidentiality

Data Privacy

Location Privacy

Identity Threats



Access Control

Unique Identification

Data Integrity

Source: Mohanty iSES 2018 Keynote


# Blockchain in Smart Healthcare



Source: C. Esposito, A. De Santis, G. Tortora, H. Chang and K. R. Choo, "Blockchain: A Panacea for Healthcare Cloud-Based Data Security and Privacy?," IEEE Cloud Computing, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 31-37, Jan./Feb. 2018.

# Smart Healthcare Security – Medical Signal Authentication


- ❑ Physiological signals like the electrocardiogram (EKG) are obtained from patients, transmitted to the cloud, and can also be stored in a cloud repository.
- ❑ With increasing adoption of electronic medical records and cloud-based software-as-a-service (SaaS), advanced security measures are necessary.
- ❑ Protection from unauthorized access to Protected Health Information (PHI) also protects from identity theft schemes.
- ❑ From an economic stand-point, it is important to safeguard the healthcare and insurance system from fraudulent claims.



Source: Tseng 2014, Tseng Sensors Feb 2014

# CE System Security – Smart Car

## Selected Attacks on Autonomous Cars



Cars can have 100 Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and 100 million lines of code, each from different vendors – Massive security issues.


Source: <http://www.computerworld.com/article/3005436/cybercrime-hacking/black-hat-europe-it-s-easy-and-costs-only-60-to-hack-self-driving-car-sensors.html>

Source: <https://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-automotive-security.pdf>

Source: Petit 2015: IEEE-TITS Apr 2015

# Smart Car – Decision Chain


- Designing an AV requires decision chains.
- Human driven vehicles are controlled directly by a human.
- AV actuators controlled by algorithms.
- Decision chain involves sensor data, perception, planning and actuation.
- Perception transforms sensory data to useful information.
- Planning involves decision making.



Source: Plathottam 2018, COMSNETS 2018

# Autonomous Car Security – Collision Avoidance

- ❑ **Attack:** Feeding of malicious sensor measurements to the control and the collision avoidance module. Such an attack on a position sensor can result in collisions between the vehicles.
- ❑ **Solutions:** “**Dynamic Watermarking**” of signals to detect and stop such attacks on cyber-physical systems.
- ❑ **Idea:** Superimpose each actuator  $i$  a random signal  $e_i[t]$  (watermark) on control policy-specified input.



Source: Ko 2016, CPS-Sec 2016

# RFID Security - Attacks



Selected  
RFID  
Attacks



Physical  
RFID  
Threats

Disabling Tags

Tag Modification

Cloning Tags

Reverse Engineering and Physical Exploration

RFID  
Channel  
Threats

Eavesdropping

Snooping

Skimming

Replay Attack

Relay Attacks

Electromagnetic Interference


System  
Threats

Counterfeiting and Spoofing Attacks

Tracing and Tracking

Password Decoding

Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks



Source: Khattab 2017; Springer 2017 RFID Security

Numerous Applications

# RFID Security - Solutions

## Selected RFID Security Methods

Killing Tags

Sleeping Tags

Faraday Cage

Blocker Tags



Tag Relabeling

Minimalist Cryptography

Proxy Privacy Devices



Faraday Cage



Blocker Tags

Source: Khattab 2017, Springer 2017 RFID Security

# NFC Security - Attacks

## Selected NFC Attacks

Eavesdropping

Data Modification

Relay Attacks

Data Corruption

Spoofing

Interception Attacks

Theft



Source: <http://www.idigitaltimes.com/new-android-nfc-attack-could-steal-money-credit-cards-anytime-your-phone-near-445497>






Source: <http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/near-field-communication-nfc-technology-vulnerabilities-and-principal-attack-schema/>



Source: <https://www.slideshare.net/cgvwzq/on-relaying-nfc-payment-transactions-using-android-devices>

# NFC Security



Source: Mohanty 2017, CE Magazine Jan 2017


# Memory Attacks

Read confidential information in memory

Snooping Attacks

Spoofing Attacks

Replace a block with fake



Splicing Attacks

Replace a block with a block from another location

Physical access memory to retrieve encryption keys

Cold Boot Attacks

Replay Attacks

Value of a block at a given address at one time is written at exactly the same address at a different times; Hardest attack.

Source: S. Nimgaonkar, M. Gomathisankaran, and S. P. Mohanty, "TSV: A Novel Energy Efficient Memory Integrity Verification Scheme for Embedded Systems", Elsevier Journal of Systems Architecture, Vol. 59, No. 7, Aug 2013, pp. 400-411.

# Nonvolatile Memory Security and Protection



Source: <http://datalocker.com>

Nonvolatile / Harddrive Storage


Hardware-based encryption of data secured/protected by strong password/PIN authentication.

Software-based encryption to secure systems and partitions of hard drive.


Some performance penalty due to increase in latency!

# Embedded Memory Security and Protection

Trusted On-Chip Boundary



On-Chip/On-Board Memory Protection




Write Operation

Read Operation

Source: S. Nimgaonkar, M. Gomathisankaran, and S. P. Mohanty, "MEM-DnP: A Novel Energy Efficient Approach for Memory Integrity Detection and Protection in Embedded Systems", Springer Circuits, Systems, and Signal Processing Journal (CSSP), Volume 32, Issue 6, December 2013, pp. 2581--2604.



# Firmware Security



Source: <https://www.nxp.com/docs/en/white-paper/AUTOSECURITYWP.pdf>

# How Secure is AES Encryption?


- Brute force a 128 bit key ?
- If you assume
  - Every person on the planet owns 10 computers
  - Each of these computers can test 1 billion key combinations per second
  - There are 7 billion people on the planet
  - On average, you can crack the key after testing 50% of the possibilities
  - Then the earth's population can crack one 128 bit encryption key in 77,000,000,000 years (77 billion years)

**Age of the Earth      4.54 ± 0.05 billion years**

**Age of the Universe 13.799 ± 0.021 billion years**


Source: Parameswaran Keynote iNIS-2017

# Side Channel Analysis Attacks







Source: Parameswaran Keynote iNIS-2017

# Side Channel Attacks – Differential and Correlation Power Analysis (DPA/CDA)



Source: Mohanty 2018, ZINC Keynote 2018

# DPA Resilience Hardware: Design




Source: J. Mathew, S. P. Mohanty, S. Banerjee, D. K. Pradhan, and A. M. Jabir, "Attack Tolerant Cryptographic Hardware Design by Combining Galois Field Error Correction and Uniform Switching Activity", Elsevier Computers and Electrical Engineering, Vol. 39, No. 4, May 2013, pp. 1077--1087.

# Copyright, Intellectual Property (IP), Or Ownership Protection


## Media Ownership



- Whose is it?
- Is it tampered with?
- Where was it created?
- Who had created it?
- ... and more.




## Hardware Ownership




Chip at Original Design House

IP cores or reusable cores are used as a cost effective SoC solution but sharing poses a security and ownership issues.

Goes to Another Design House for Reuse




Chip at Another Design House




Source: Mohanty ZINC 2018 Keynote

# Secure Better Portable Graphics (SBPG)




Secure  
BPG  
(SBPG)



Secure Digital Camera  
(SDC) with SBPG


Simulink Prototyping  
Throughput: 44 frames/sec  
Power Dissipation: 8 nW



High-Efficiency Video  
Coding Architecture

Source: S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougiannos, and P. Guturu, "SBPG: Secure Better Portable Graphics for Trustworthy Media Communications in the IoT (Invited Paper)", IEEE Access Journal, Volume 6, 2018, pp. 5939--5953.

# Security Star Ratings




Source: [https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/star/#\\_overview](https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/star/#_overview)

Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) Security, Trust & Assurance Registry (STAR)

# Response Smart




# Smart Sensors - General-Purpose/ Synthetic Sensors



Source: Laput 2017, <http://www.gierad.com/projects/supersensor/>




# Systems – End Devices



Google  
Now

Windows  
Cortana



# Smart Transportation

Autonomous/ Driverless/ Self-Driving/ Smart Care




Autonomous Vehicle (AV) is capable of sensing its environment and navigating without human input.

“The global market of IoT based connected cars is expected to reach \$46 Billion by 2020.”

Datta 2017: CE Magazine Oct 2017

# Autonomous/Driverless/Self-Driving Car

## Smart Car



Source: <http://www.computerworld.com/article/3005436/cybercrime-hacking/black-hat-europe-it-s-easy-and-costs-only-60-to-hack-self-driving-car-sensors.html>

“The global market of IoT based connected cars is expected to reach \$46 Billion by 2020.”

Datta 2017: CE Magazine Oct 2017

### Level 0

- ☐ Complete Driver Control

### Level 1

- ☐ Most functions by driver, some functions automated.

### Level 2

- ☐ At least one driver-assistance system is automated.

### Level 3

- ☐ Complete shift of critical safety systems to vehicle; Driver can intervene


### Level 4

- ☐ Perform All Safety-Critical Functions
- ☐ Limited to Operational Domain

### Level 5

- ☐ All Safety-Critical Functions in All Environments and Scenarios

# Smart Car: Technology Roadmap



Source:

[https://www.3m.com/3M/en\\_US/particles/all-articles/article-detail/~transportation-future-of-mobility-automotive-cars/?storyid=8cea30a4-fe36-4abe-889a-37ea15134293](https://www.3m.com/3M/en_US/particles/all-articles/article-detail/~transportation-future-of-mobility-automotive-cars/?storyid=8cea30a4-fe36-4abe-889a-37ea15134293)

[http://www.cargroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Technology\\_Roadmap\\_Combined\\_23JAN18.pdf](http://www.cargroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Technology_Roadmap_Combined_23JAN18.pdf)

# Smart Healthcare



## Healthy Living

- Fitness Tracking
- Disease Prevention
- Food monitoring

## Home Care

- Mobile health
- Telemedicine
- Self-management
- Assisted Living

## Acute care


- Hospital
- Specialty clinic
- Nursing Home
- Community Hospital

Frost and Sullivan predict smart health-care market value to reach US\$348.5 billion by 2025.



Source: P. Sundaravadivel, E. Kougianos, S. P. Mohanty, and M. Ganapathiraju, "Everything You Wanted to Know about Smart Health Care", IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (CEM), Volume 7, Issue 1, January 2018, pp. 18-28.

# Smart Healthcare



Fitness Trackers



Headband with Embedded Neurosensors



Embedded Skin Patches

Sethi 2017; JECE 2017

Quality and sustainable healthcare with limited resources.

Source: Mohanty 2016, CE Magazine July 2016

# Smart Healthcare - Characteristics - 7Ps



Source: H. Zhu, C. K. Wu, C. H. KOO, Y. T. Tsang, Y.Liu, H. R. Chi, and K. F. Tsang, "Smart Healthcare in the Era of Internet-of-Things", IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine, 2019, Accepted.



# Smart Healthcare – Diet Monitoring

## Automated Food intake Monitoring and Diet Prediction System

- Smart plate
- Data acquisition using mobile
- ML based Future Meal Prediction

User takes a picture of the Nutrition Facts using Smart Phone

Use Optical Character Recognition (OCR) to convert images to text

Nutrition facts obtained through OCR

User scans the barcode of the product

Using Open Application Program Interface (API)'s and Database approach, the nutrition facts are acquired from Central database

Nutrient facts obtained through API's



Weight and Time information obtained through Sensing Board

Calculate Nutrient Value of the meal

Save the Nutrient value, Weight, Time of each meal for future predictions



### Smart-Log



Feedback to the user



Camera to acquire Nutrient values

Data logged into Cloud

8172 user instances were considered


USDA National Nutrient Database used for nutrient values of 8791 items.

Research Works	Food Recognition Method	Efficiency (%)
This Work	Mapping nutrition facts to a database	98.4

Source: P. Sundaravadivel, K. Kesavan, L. Kesavan, S. P. Mohanty, and E. Kougianos, "Smart-Log: A Deep-Learning based Automated Nutrition Monitoring System in the IoT", IEEE Trans. on Consumer Electronics, Vol 64, No 3, Aug 2018, pp. 390-398.



# Smart Healthcare - Activity Monitoring




Automated Physiological Monitoring System

Research Works	Method (WEKA)	Features considered	Activities	Accuracy (%)
This Work	Adaptive algorithm based on feature extraction	Step detection and Step length estimation	Walking, sitting, standing, etc.	97.9

P. Sundaravadivel, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, V. P. Yanambaka, and M. K. Ganapathiraju, "Smart-Walk: An Intelligent Physiological Monitoring System for Smart Families", in Proc. 36th IEEE International Conf. Consumer Electronics (ICCE), 2018.

# Smart Healthcare - Stress Monitoring & Control




Automated Stress Level Detection and Management

Sensor	Low Stress	Normal Stress	High Stress
Accelerometer (steps/min)	0-75	75-100	101-200
Humidity (RH%)	27-65	66-91	91-120
Temperature °F	98-100	90-97	80-90




Source: L. Rachakonda, P. Sundaravadivel, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and M. Ganapathiraju, "A Smart Sensor in the IoMT for Stress Level Detection", in Proc. 4th IEEE International Symposium on Smart Electronic Systems (iSES), 2018, pp. 141--145.

# Smart Healthcare - Seizure Detection & Control




## Automated Epileptic Seizure Detection and Control System



Cloud Vs Edge	Latency	Accuracy
Cloud-IoT based Detection	2.5 sec	98.65%
Edge-IoT based Detection	1.4 sec	98.65%

Source: M. A. Sayeed, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and H. Zaveri, "Neuro-Detect: A Machine Learning Based Fast and Accurate Seizure Detection System in the IoMT", *IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics (TCE)*, Volume XX, Issue YY, ZZ 2019, pp. Accepted on 16 May 2019, DOI: 10.1109/TCE.2019.2917895 .

# Smart Cities - Components



A smart city can have one or more of the smart components.

Source: S. P. Mohanty, U. Choppali, and E. Kougianos, "Everything You wanted to Know about Smart Cities", IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (CEM), Volume 5, Issue 3, July 2016, pp. 60--70.


# Smart Cities - 3 Is



Instrumentation

The 3Is are provided by the Internet of Things (IoT).

Smart Cities



Intelligence


Interconnection



Source: Mohanty EuroSimE 2016 Keynote Presentation


# IoT Architecture - 7 Level Model

Levels



Source: [http://cdn.iotwf.com/resources/71/IoT\\_Reference\\_Model\\_White\\_Paper\\_June\\_4\\_2014.pdf](http://cdn.iotwf.com/resources/71/IoT_Reference_Model_White_Paper_June_4_2014.pdf)

# Data Analytics is Key to be Smart




Sensors, social networks, web pages, image and video applications, and mobile devices generate more than 2.5 quintillion bytes data per day.

Source: S. P. Mohanty, U. Choppali, and E. Kougianos, "Everything You wanted to Know about Smart Cities", IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (CEM), Volume 5, Issue 3, July 2016, pp. 60--70.

# Artificial Intelligence Technology

Machine Learning

Deep Learning



Source: <http://transmitter.ieee.org/impact-aimachine-learning-iot-various-industries/>

Tensor Processing Unit (TPU)



Smart City Use:  
■ Better analytics  
■ Better decision  
■ Faster response


Source: <https://fosbytes.com/googles-home-made-ai-processor-is-30x-faster-than-cpus-and-gpus/>

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# Energy, Security, and Response Smart (ESR-Smart)


# Energy Consumption in IoT

Energy from Supply/Battery -  
Energy consumed by  
Workstations, PC, Software,  
Communications




Local  
Area  
Network  
(LAN)

Battery Operated - Energy  
consumed by Sensors,  
Actuators, Microcontrollers




The Things

Energy from Supply/Battery -  
Energy consumed by  
Communications



The Cloud




Energy from  
Supply - Energy  
consumed in  
Server, Storage,  
Software,  
Communications


Four Main Components of IoT.

Source: Mohanty 2016, EuroSimE 2016 Keynote Presentation

# Energy Consumption of Sensors, Components, and Systems




Source: Mohanty 2015, McGraw-Hill 2015



Legend: GSM (Yellow), CPU (Red), RAM (Blue), Graphics (Green), LCD (Orange), Others (Light Blue)

During GSM Communications



Legend: GSM (Yellow), CPU (Red), WiFi (Pink), Graphics (Green), LCD (Orange), Others (Blue)

During WiFi Communications

# Energy Consumption and Latency in Communications

- IoT with Cloud: Sensor big data goes to cloud for storage and analytics – Consumes significant energy in communications network
- Connected cars require latency of ms to communicate and avoid impending crash:
  - Faster connection
  - Low latency
  - Lower power
- **5G** for connected world: Enables all devices to be connected seamlessly.




Source: <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/key-technologies-connected-world-cloud-computing-ioe-balakrishnan>


# Communications – Energy and Data, Range Tradeoffs

- **LoRa:** Long Range, low-powered, low-bandwidth, IoT communications as compared to 5G or Bluetooth.
- **SigFox:** SigFox utilizes an ultra-narrowband wide-reaching signal that can pass through solid objects.


Technology	Protocol	Maximum Data Rate	Coverage Range
ZigBee	ZigBee Pro	250 kbps	1 mile
WLAN	802.11x	2-600 Mbps	0.06 mile
Cellular	5G	1 Gbps	Short - Medium
LoRa	LoRa	50 kbps	3-12 miles
SigFox	SigFox	1 kbps	6-30 miles



# Blockchain - Challenges




- Energy for mining of 1 bitcoin → 2 years consumption of a US household.
- Energy consumption for each bitcoin transaction → 80,000X of energy consumption of a credit card processing.




Source: D. Puthal, N. Malik, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and G. Das, "Everything you Wanted to Know about the Blockchain", *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (CEM)*, Volume 7, Issue 4, July 2018, pp. 06--14.

# Blockchain Applications




Source: Deepak Puthal, Nisha Malik, Saraju P. Mohanty, Elias Kougianos, and Gautam Das, "Everything you Wanted to Know about the Blockchain", IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 6--14, 2018.

# Blockchain Technology




Source: D. Puthal, N. Malik, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and G. Das, "Everything you Wanted to Know about the Blockchain", *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (CEM)*, Volume 7, Issue 4, July 2018, pp. 06--14.

# IoT Friendly Blockchain - Proof-of-Authentication (PoAh)



Source: D. Puthal and S. P. Mohanty, "Proof of Authentication: IoT-Friendly Blockchains", *IEEE Potentials Magazine*, Volume 38, Issue 1, January 2019, pp. 26--29.

# IoT Friendly Blockchain - Proof-of-Authentication (PoAh)




	Proof-of-Work (PoW)	Proof-of-Stake (PoS)	Proof-of-Activity (PoA)	Proof-of-Authentication (PoAh)
Energy consumption	High	High	High	Low
Computation requirements	High	High	High	Low
Latency	High	High	High	Low
Search space	High	Low	NA	NA

**PoW - 10 min in cloud**    **PoAh - 3 sec in Raspberry Pi**    **PoAh - 200X faster than PoW**

Source: D. Puthal, S. P. Mohanty, P. Nanda, E. Kougianos, and G. Das, "Proof-of-Authentication for Scalable Blockchain in Resource-Constrained Distributed Systems", in Proc. 37th IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics (ICCE), 2019.

# Security Measures in Smart Devices – Smart Healthcare



Collectively (WMD+IMD):  
Implantable and Wearable Medical Devices (IWMDs)

Implantable and Wearable Medical Devices (IWMDs) --  
Battery Characteristics:  
→ Longer life  
→ Safer  
→ Smaller size  
→ Smaller weight

Source: Mohanty Keynote ICCE 2019


# Implanted Medical Devices - Attacks



- The vulnerabilities affect implantable cardiac devices and the external equipment used to communicate with them.
- The devices emit RF signals that can be detected up to several meters from the body.
- A malicious individual nearby could conceivably hack into the signal to jam it, alter it, or snoop on it.

Source: Emily Waltz, Can "Internet-of-Body" Thwart Cyber Attacks on Implanted Medical Devices?, IEEE Spectrum, 28 Mar 2019, <https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-human-os/biomedical/devices/thwart-cyber-attacks-on-implanted-medical-devices.amp.html>.

# IoMT Security - Energy Constrained



Pacemaker  
Battery Life  
- 10 years




Neurostimulator  
Battery Life  
- 8 years

- Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) have integrated battery to provide energy to all their functions → Limited Battery Life depending on functions
- Higher battery/energy usage → Lower IMD lifetime
- Battery/IMD replacement → Needs surgical risky procedures


Source: Carmen Camara, PedroPeris-Lopez, and Juan E.Tapiadora, "Security and privacy issues in implantable medical devices: A comprehensive survey", Elsevier Journal of Biomedical Informatics, Volume 55, June 2015, Pages 272-289.

# IoMT Security - PUF based Device Authentication



Source: V. P. Yanambaka, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and D. Puthal, "PMsec: Physical Unclonable Function-Based Robust and Lightweight Authentication in the Internet of Medical Things", IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics (TCE), Volume XX, Issue YY, ZZ 2019, pp. Accepted on 28 June 2019, DOI: 10.1109/TCE.2019.2926192.

# IoMT Security - PUF based Device Authentication



Average Power Overhead –  
~ 200  $\mu$ W

Proposed Approach Characteristics	Value (in a FPGA / Raspberry Pi platform)
Time to Generate the Key at Server	800 ms
Time to Generate the Key at IoMT Device	800 ms
Time to Authenticate the Device	1.2 sec - 1.5 sec

Source: V. P. Yanambaka, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and D. Puthal, "PMsec: Physical Unclonable Function-Based Robust and Lightweight Authentication in the Internet of Medical Things", IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics (TCE), Volume XX, Issue YY, ZZ 2019, pp. Accepted on 28 June 2019, DOI: 10.1109/TCE.2019.2926192.

# Smart Car Security - Latency Constrained

## Protecting Communications

Particularly any Modems for In-vehicle Infotainment (IVI) or in On-board Diagnostics (OBD-II)

Over The Air (OTA) Management  
From the Cloud to Each Car

Cars can have 100 Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and 100 million lines of code, each from different vendors – Massive security issues.

## Protecting Each Module

Sensors, Actuators, and Anything with an Microcontroller Unit (MCU)

Mitigating Advanced Threats  
Analytics in the Car and in the Cloud

■ Connected cars require latency of ms to communicate and avoid impending crash:

- Faster connection
- Low latency
- Energy efficiency

## Security Mechanism Affects:


- Latency
- Mileage
- Battery Life

Car Security –  
Latency Constraints



Source: [http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/white\\_papers/public-building-security-into-cars-20150805.pdf](http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/white_papers/public-building-security-into-cars-20150805.pdf)

# UAV Security - Energy & Latency Constrained



Security Mechanisms Affect:

Battery Life    Latency    Weight    Aerodynamics

UAV Security – Energy and Latency Constraints



Source: <http://politicalblindspot.com/u-s-drone-hacked-and-hijacked-with-ease/>

# Attacks - Software Vs Hardware

## Software Based

- Software attacks via communication channels
- Typically from remote
- More frequent
- Selected Software based:
  - ❑ Denial-of-Service (DoS)
  - ❑ Routing Attacks
  - ❑ Malicious Injection
  - ❑ Injection of fraudulent packets
  - ❑ Snooping attack of memory
  - ❑ Spoofing attack of memory and IP address
  - ❑ Password-based attacks

## Hardware Based

- Hardware or physical attacks
- Maybe local
- More difficult to prevent
- Selected Hardware based:
  - ❑ Hardware backdoors (e.g. Trojan)
  - ❑ Inducing faults
  - ❑ CE system tampering/jailbreaking
  - ❑ Eavesdropping for protected memory
  - ❑ Side channel attack
  - ❑ CE hardware counterfeiting

Source: Mohanty ICCE Panel 2018

# Security - Software Vs Hardware

## Software Based

- Introduces latency in operation
- Flexible - Easy to use, upgrade and update
- Wider-Use - Use for all devices in an organization
- Higher recurring operational cost
- Tasks of encryption easy compared to hardware – substitution tables
- Needs general purpose processor
- Can't stop hardware reverse engineering

## Hardware Based

- High-Speed operation
- Energy-Efficient operation
- Low-cost using ASIC and FPGA
- Tasks of encryption easy compared to software – bit permutation
- Easy integration in CE systems
- Possible security at source-end like sensors, better suitable for IoT
- Susceptible to side-channel attacks
- Can't stop software reverse engineering

Maintaining of Security of Consumer Electronics, CE Systems, IoT, CPS, etc. needs Energy and affects performance.

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# Hardware Assisted Security

- Software based Security:
  - A general purposed processor is a deterministic machine that computes the next instruction based on the program counter.
  - Software based security approaches that rely on some form of encryption can't be full proof as breaking them is just matter of time.
  - It is projected that quantum computers that use different paradigms than the existing computers will make things worse.
- Hardware-Assisted Security: Security/Protection provided by the hardware: for information being processed by a CE system, for hardware itself, and/or for the CE system.

# Hardware Assisted Security

- Hardware-Assisted Security: Security provided by hardware for:
  - (1) information being processed,
  - (2) hardware itself,
  - (3) overall system
- Additional hardware components used for security.
- Hardware design modification is performed.
- System design modification is performed.

RF Hardware Security    Digital Hardware Security – Side Channel

Hardware Trojan Protection    Information Security, Privacy, Protection

IR Hardware Security    Memory Protection    Digital Core IP Protection


Source: Mohanty ICCE 2018 Panel

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# Trustworthy CE System

- A selective attributes of CE system to be trustworthy:
  - ❑ It must maintain integrity of information it is processing.
  - ❑ It must conceal any information about the computation performed through any side channels such as power analysis or timing analysis.
  - ❑ It must perform only the functionality it is designed for, nothing more and nothing less.
  - ❑ It must not malfunction during operations in critical applications.
  - ❑ It must be transparent only to its owner in terms of design details and states.
  - ❑ It must be designed using components from trusted vendors.
  - ❑ It must be built/fabricated using trusted fabs.


# Security Primitives - PUF



PUFs don't store keys in digital memory, rather derive a key based on the physical characteristics of the hardware; thus secure.

Source: S. Joshi, S. P. Mohanty, and E. Kougianos, "Everything You Wanted to Know about PUFs", *IEEE Potentials Magazine*, Volume 36, Issue 6, November-December 2017, pp. 38--46.




# Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) - Principle



Silicon manufacturing process variations are turned into a feature rather than a problem.

Source: V. P. Yanambaka, S. P. Mohanty, and E. Kougianos, "Making Use of Semiconductor Manufacturing Process Variations: FinFET-based Physical Unclonable Functions for Efficient Security Integration in the IoT", Springer Analog Integrated Circuits and Signal Processing Journal, Volume 93, Issue 3, December 2017, pp. 429--441.

# Power Optimized Hybrid Oscillator Arbiter PUF




Characteristics	FinFET Technology	DLFET Technology
Average Power	219.34 $\mu$ W	121.3 $\mu$ W
Hamming Distance	49.3 %	48 %
Time to generate key	150 ns	150 ns

Source: V. P. Yanambaka, S. P. Mohanty, and E. Kougianos, "Making Use of Manufacturing Process Variations: A Dopingless Transistor Based-PUF for Hardware-Assisted Security", IEEE Transactions on Semiconductor Manufacturing (TSM), Volume 31, Issue 2, May 2018, pp. 285--294.




# Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) - Applications




Source: S. Joshi, S. P. Mohanty, and E. Kougianos, "Everything You Wanted to Know about PUFs", IEEE Potentials Magazine, Volume 36, Issue 6, Nov-Dec 2017, pp. 38--46.

# CE/IoT System - Multi-Objective Tradeoffs



# ESR-Smart – End-Device Optimization



Include additional/alternative hardware/software components and uses DVFS like technology for energy and performance optimization.

Source: S. P. Mohanty, "A Secure Digital Camera Architecture for Integrated Real-Time Digital Rights Management", Elsevier Journal of Systems Architecture (JSA), Volume 55, Issues 10-12, October-December 2009, pp. 468-480.


Source: Mohanty 2006, TCAS-II May 2006; Mohanty 2009, JSA Oct 2009; Mohanty 2016, Access 2016

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# Challenges in Making Smart

# Deep Learning is the Key

- “DL at the Edge” overlaps all of these research areas.
- New Foundation Technologies, enhance data curation, improved AI, and Networks accuracy.



Source: Corcoran Keynote 2018

# ML Modeling Issues



High Energy Requirements

High Computational Resource Requirements


Large Amount of Data Requirements

Machine Learning Issues

Underfitting/Overfitting Issue

Class Imbalance Issue


Fake Data Issue




# Deep Neural Network (DNN) - Resource and Energy Costs

**TRAIN:** Iterate until you achieve satisfactory performance.

**Needs Significant:**  
 ➤ Resource  
 ➤ Energy




**PREDICT:** Integrate trained models into applications.



**Needs:**  
 ➤ Resource  
 ➤ Energy

Source: <https://www.mathworks.com/campaigns/offers/mastering-machine-learning-with-matlab.html>

# DNN Training - Energy Issue




- DNN considers many training parameters, such as the size, the learning rate, and initial weights.
- High computational resource and time: For sweeping through the parameter space for optimal parameters.
- DNN needs: **Multicore processors and batch processing.**
- DNN training happens mostly in cloud not at edge or fog.

Source: Mohanty iSES 2018 Keynote


# Enhancing DNN Training/Learning

Federated Learning (Google) –  
A type of Distributed Learning



Source: <https://ai.googleblog.com/2017/04/federated-learning-collaborative.html>


## Hierarchical Learning



Source: O. Okobiah, S. P. Mohanty, and E. Kougianos, "Kriging Bootstrapped Neural Network Training for Fast and Accurate Process Variation Analysis", in Proceedings of the 15th ISQED, 2014, pp. 365--372.

# DNN - Overfitting or Inflation Issue

- DNN is overfitted or inflated - If the accuracy of DNN model is better than the training dataset
- DNN architecture may be more complex than it is required for a specific problem.
- Solutions: Different datasets, reduce complexity



Source: [www.algotrading101.com](http://www.algotrading101.com)

# DNN - Class Imbalance Issue


- Class imbalance is a classification problems where the classes are not represented equally.
- Solutions: Use Precision, Recall, F-measure metrics  
Not only RMSE like accuracy metrics



# DNNs are not Always Smart

DNNs can learn to recognize complex objects with high confidence ...


But often they learn features that don't make sense to a human ...



Source: Nguyen, et al. 2014 - Deep Neural Networks are Easily Fooled: High Confidence Predictions for Unrecognizable Images

Source: Corcoran Keynote 2018

# DNNs are not Always Smart



DNNs can be fooled by certain “learned” (Adversarial) patterns ...

Source: Nguyen, et al. 2014 - Deep Neural Networks are Easily Fooled: High Confidence Predictions for Unrecognizable Images

Source: Corcoran Keynote 2018

# DNNs are not Always Smart



robin

cheetah

armadillo

lesser panda



In fact "noise" will sometime work ...

centipede

peacock

jackfruit

bubble




Source: Nguyen, et al. 2014 - Deep Neural Networks are Easily Fooled: High Confidence Predictions for Unrecognizable Images

Source: Corcoran Keynote 2018

# DNNs are not Always Smart

- Why not use **Fake Data**?
- “Fake Data” has some interesting advantages:
  - Avoids *privacy issues* and side-steps *new regulations* (e.g. General Data Protection Regulation or GDPR)
  - Significant cost reductions in data acquisition and annotation for big datasets




Source: Corcoran Keynote 2018

# Where and How to Compute?



Sensor, Edge, Fog, Cloud?



ASIC, FPGA, SoC, FP-SoC, GPU, Neuromorphic, Quantum?

# Fog Vs Edge Vs Cloud Computing

Fog computing and edge computing involve pushing intelligence and processing capabilities closer to where the data originates from "Things" to reduce communication traffic and improve IoT response.

## Edge Computing

- Dedicated App Hosting
- Embedded OS

- Device management
- Data Service
- Communication

- Real-Time Control
- Real-Time Analysis
- Data Ownership Protection
- Secure Multi-Cloud interworking

## Fog Computing

## Cloud Computing

- Scalability
- Big Data Analytics
- Software as a Service (SaaS)
- Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)
- Platform as a Service (PaaS)
- Resource Pooling
- Elastic Compute
- Secure Access

**Edge:** Intelligence, Processing, and Communication - Devices like Programmable Automation Controllers (PACs)

**Fog:** Intelligence - LAN, Processing - fog node or IoT gateway.

Source: <https://www.automationworld.com/fog-computing-vs-edge-computing-whats-difference>

Source: <https://www.nebbiolo.tech/wp-content/uploads/whitepaper-fog-vs-edge.pdf>

# Computing Technology - IoT Platform




ESP8266



Source: <https://www.sparkfun.com/products/13678>




NodeMCU



Arduino

Raspberry Pi



LattePanda


Source: <http://www.lattepanda.com>

# Computing Technology - Current and Emerging



Neural Processing Unit (NPU)

Source:  
<https://www.qualcomm.com/news/onq/2013/10/10/introducing-qualcomm-zeroth-processors-brain-inspired-computing>



Tensor Processing Unit (TPU)

Source: <https://fossbytes.com/googles-home-made-ai-processor-is-30x-faster-than-cpus-and-gpus/>



FPGA



320 trillion operations per second

SoC based Design: 30 watts of power

Source:  
<https://www.engadget.com/2017/10/10/nvidia-introduces-a-computer-for-level-5-autonomous-cars/>


GPU

# ML Hardware – Cloud and Edge

Product	Cloud or Edge	Chip Type
Nvidia - DGX series	Cloud	GPU
Nvidia - Drive	Edge	GPU
Arm - ML Processor	Edge	CPU
NXP - i.MX processor	Edge	CPU
Xilinx - Zynq	Edge	Hybrid CPU/FPGA
Xilinx - Virtex	Cloud	FPGA
Google - TPU	Cloud	ASIC
Tesla - AI Chip	Edge	Unknown
Intel - Nervana	Cloud	CPU
Intel - Loihi	Cloud	Neuromorphic
Amazon - Echo (custom AI chip)	Edge	Unknown
Apple - A11 processor	Edge	CPU
Nokia - Reefshark	Edge	CPU
Huawei - Kirin 970	Edge	CPU
AMD - Radeon Instinct MI25	Cloud	GPU
IBM - TrueNorth	Cloud	Neuromorphic
IBM - Power9	Cloud	CPU
Alibaba - Ali-NPU	Cloud	Unknown
Qualcomm AI Engine	Edge	CPU
Mediatek - APU	Edge	CPU

Source: Presutto 2018: [https://www.academia.edu/37781087/Current\\_Artificial\\_Intelligence\\_Trends\\_Hardware\\_and\\_Software\\_Accelerators\\_2018\\_](https://www.academia.edu/37781087/Current_Artificial_Intelligence_Trends_Hardware_and_Software_Accelerators_2018_)

# End, Edge Vs Cloud Security, Intelligence ...



## End Security/Intelligence

- Minimal Data
- Minimal Computational Resource
- Least Accurate Data Analytics
- Very Rapid Response

## Edge Security/Intelligence

- Less Data
- Less Computational Resource
- Less Accurate Data Analytics
- Rapid Response

## Cloud Security/Intelligence

- Big Data
- Lots of Computational Resource
- Accurate Data Analytics
- Latency in Network
- Energy overhead in Communications

Source: Mohanty iSES 2018 Keynote

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# Conclusions



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# Smart and Intelligence – Dictionary Meaning

## Smart:

1 (of a person) clean, tidy, and well dressed.

‘you look very smart’

2.1 (of a device) programmed so as to be capable of some independent action.

‘hi-tech smart weapons’

## Intelligence:

The ability to acquire and apply knowledge and skills.

Source: <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com>


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# Smartness

- Ability to take decisions based on the data, circumstances, situations?
- Analytics + Responses



# Does Smart Mean Wise?



Source: <https://www.awesomeinventions.com/wise-vs-smart/>

- Can Electronics be wise?


- Why not?
- If AI is intelligence, then it should evolve to **wise!**

# Intelligence Quotient (IQ) ?



- If Smart Electronics means Intelligence then can we measure its IQ?

# How to Train Yourself To Be Smarter



Source: Michael Simmons: <https://getpocket.com/explore/item/this-is-exactly-how-you-should-train-yourself-to-be-smarter>

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# Conclusions

- “Smart” terms is used to present a variety of characteristics of CE.
- Energy smart is important for battery and energy costs point of view.
- Security smart is important for connected CE.
- Response smart is making decisions based on ML data analytics.
- ML has its own cost in terms of training and execution.
- ESR-smart is the trade-offs of energy, security, and response in the design of CE.

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# Future Directions

- Security, Privacy, IP Protection of Information and System need more research.
- Security of the CE systems (e.g. smart healthcare device, UAV, Smart Cars) needs research.
- Important aspect of smart CE design: trade-offs among energy, response latency, and security.
- Edge computing involving data curation, learning, and security at the edge is an important research direction.

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Hardware are the drivers of the civilization, even softwares need them.

# Thank You !!!

Slides Available at: <http://www.smohanty.org>



**Smart Electronic Systems  
Laboratory (SESL)**

**UNT** DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER  
SCIENCE & ENGINEERING  
College of Engineering  
EST. 1890